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An Interview W1th Colm Km

An Interview With Colin King
Colin King is a graduate of Sandhurst. He served 14 years in the British Army,
gaining extensive knowledge of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and served
both as an instructor at the British EOD School and as the sole EOD analyst
for the Ministry of Defense for six years. He founded an EOD Consultancy
company, which conducts assessments, training and operational trials
worldwide. He is also the editor of Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance.

by Margaret Buse, Editor
Margaret Buse (MB): Can you tell
me about training the Afghan deminers?
Colin King (CK): I think it was really
the first major UN demining initiative.
The deminers were all mujahideen, and
they were sent to one of two training
centers. I led one of two teams based in
Quetta, which was just on the border in
Pakistan in the southern desert region;
then there was another cen rer in Peshawar
to the north. Looking back, the program
was very basic. It was totally focused on
trai ning people to remove mi nes, UXO
an d booby traps. There was really no
attention ro rhe orher aspects of mine
actio n- and none of the supporr
functions or quality assurance; none of that
was really thought about in those days.
MB: Who did your assessments when you
went in?
CK: T hi s p rogram was purely about
training deminers for mine and UXO
clearance. There was lirrle thought at that
time as to which areas they would be going
into, prioritizing tasks or what equipment
rhey would use. They were basically scm in
with a bag of hand tools, a kid's $ 10 Radio
Shack metal detector and not much else.
MB: When did you starr your demining
efforts?
CK: My first experience with mines was
the Falklands. The actual Falklands war
was in 1982, a nd I wenr there two years
late r. T h en two yea rs afte r that, I
commanded all bomb disposal operations
on the island, including responsibility for
the minefields. We basically rried to keep
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the minefields under control by going afrer
mines rhat had moved, or were in danger
of moving, and responding to emergency
calls on mines and other UXO.

MB: You're talking from 1984 to 2003,
almost 20 years. Can you tell me how mine
action has changed from where it was
when you first started to where it is today?
CK: To me, one of the most obvious
changes is the adoption of PPE [Personal
Protective Equipment), which just wasn't
a prominent issue when I first starred. It
was available, bur in the army, we mainly
wore protective equipment for terrorist
bomb disposa l; we rarely bothered with it
for a nything to do with mines. We didn't
wear it at anytime during operations in
the Falklands, and I didn't use PPE for
many years afterwards. It wasn't really until
my fr iend Paul Jefferson got severely
injured in Kuwait that the issue was
properly highlighted.
MB: PP E was not used for military
clearance or humanitarian demining?
CK: It just wasn't someth ing that people
recognized as a significant consideration
in the early days. That changed, I think,
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(Left to Right) Examining Iraqi mines in the Gulf; PPE was
rarely worn during military operations in t hose days.
Coli n uncovering an M19 mine in t he Jorda n valley, w here
the temperature exceeded 40° Celsius.

as the casualties built up during the postwar clearance in the Gul£ Paul was rl1e first
major British casualty among the clearance
tean1s, and that incident made a lot of people
stop and think.

MB : Could you tell me about the
accident?
CK: Paul was a very good friend of mine.
He and f were in the army together and
worked in th e same unit of the EOD
Regiment; we also handed over commands
in rl1e Falklands. J stayed in the army when
Paul lefr and went ro Kuwait, where he was
by far the most highly qualified reclmical
expert working there. He stepped on a mine
and was severely injured; he losr a leg and
was completely bl inded. A few years later, I
was an expert witness when he brought a
court case against his employers; he claimed
that they failed to provide adequate protective
equipment--eye protection, in particular. It
was absolutely true, bur then to be fair, very
few people bothered with any form ofPPE
at that time. He won the case, but regardless
of the rights or wrongs, the fact was that it

highlighted the issue from a common-sense
point of view. Also from a legal perspective,
ir was now clear char employers could be held
liable and char they needed to protect their
deminers adequately.

MB: Do you think there is more coherence
b etween military and humanitarian
demining than when you started back in
the 1980s?
CK: Well ir's strange how demining has
evolved , because in the very early days it
was rhe military who taught it, and it was
all based on the military prin ciples of
minefield breaching. Humanitarian
demining techniques didn't really exist at
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trai ning, and then again sometimes you
will see a person with absolutely no fo rmal
education that just has natu ral aptitude-good manual skills, common sense and rhe
ability to be innovative. What 1 think is
very difficult is to screen our the right
people before rhe training begins; you have
to be prepared to drop people from a
training program if they are unsuitable. 1
also think there is a significant difference
between rhe qualities you are looking fo r
in a de miner and an EOD tech nician.
EOD demands late ral thinkin g and
innovation; deminers often have to follow
a repetitive routine, and the last thing you
want is for them to start being innovative.

procedures], which state dm everybodywill
wear the equipmenr in and around the
suspect area. In terms of new equipment,
there's been a trend away from the military
combat armo r where you'd have a visor,
helmet and maybe a flat jacket. T here's much
more comprehensive protection available
that also provides berrer comfort. Depending
on your work practice, you don't necessarily
need ro cover the back of d1e body or the
back of the head. If you're working in a hot
cl imate, you now have optio ns like a visor
that doesn't require a helmet and frontal
protection that allows greater mobility of
th e back. Still, unfortunately, a lot of
mi litary dem ini ng units wi ll not
consider-or can't afford-a change from

ry resource in this business is people ana, tnan •uuy,
a lot of aood IPn IP mak·n s P dv roaress."
MB: How have you seen the tools that

their issued equipment.

rhe deminers use evolve over the last 20
years?

MB: What about rhe roo ts in the toolbox

char time. You simply had military
engineers trying to reach civilians how they
were trained to clear mines, although many
had no firsr-hand experience whatsoever.
Then gradually, as people realized that that
wasn't appropriate -and that it was
com plecely impractical-human irarian
d emining started to spl it away from
military breaching and you ended up with
a radically different approa ch. Now,
ironically, 1 see the two coming together
again; the military a re becoming far more
engaged in humanitarian operations, they
are working with and learning from the
demining NGOs [non-governmental
organizations] .
Meanwhile,
the
humanitarian de mining community is
taking a serious look at the rapid clearance
options used by the military, and seeing
what might be useful to them.

CK: lr all starred with whatever military
tools were available, still primarily the
metal detector and the probe. In m any
cases, the probe would be the bayonet, and
there are still a lor of military units rhat
f.wor using rhe bayoner. What we have
seen is the evolution of pro tective
equipment, metal detectors, probes and
other tools for either cutting vegetation or
uncovering mines, chat have developed
in co berrer, more purpose- b uil t
equipment. For example, th ere's th e
initiative by Andy Smith to build tools that
don't fragment because his research showed
that so many deminers were injured by
rools breaking up during an explosion.

MB: What do you think are som e of the

MB: You mentioned in one case how the

challenges of trai ning deminers?

tools can fail deminers; you mentioned in
your briefing about how PPE has failed
demin ers as well.

CK:] think even in the days of the Afghan
program, you could recognize that some
people had more aptitude than ochers.
So me p eopl e were reall y scared by
explosives, and purring those people in
situations where they would be dealing
with live mines or demolitions was just
the wrong thing to do. Some people had
no manual dexteri ty and that's not exactly
ideal in work like this either. Some people
just don't have the ability to absorb the

CK: There are a lor of issues here. There is
rhe common sense poinr of whether you
choose to use PPE a t all in ce rta in
circumstances. If you're up against an antirank mine then it's going to kill you regardless
of what you're wearing. Do you make the
decision nor ro wear PPE in an anti-rank
minefield? Normally, most organizations go
for simple SOPs [s tandard operar i ng
•
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and how they all integrate in their ability
to ass ist the deminer? What are they
evolving into?

CK:There's a lot of talk about rhe tool box
approach, bur i n many cases, it's
meaningless; in real ity, most derniners
simply have ro use whatever they've been
issued . You don't ofren see a program
manager going to an area sayi ng, ''Ah,
right, I see we have th is kind of vegetation,
rhis terra in, rhese mines, so we won't use
that eq u ip ment-we'll use rhis." Thar
doesn't happen in many programs. As far
as rhe international demining community
goes, certainly th ere are a nu mber of
different tools and techniques available.
Bur although each p rogram will rry ro get
rhe best tools, PPE and detectors they can
afford, they rhen tend to be stuck with
them fo r a long rime. At rhe moment, rhe
closest thing to a rrue tool-box approach
happens w here you have a number of
dernining agencies operating in a region
and swapp i ng resources among
them selves. If rhe program is big enough,
rhe mine action center [MAC] may also
have some centralized assets to loan our.

MB:There is a lor of new technology char's
emerging-everything fro m rhe ground
penetrating radar to rhe bees and so on.

Where do you see d1e new technology going?
Do you rhink that's moneywasred or do you
feel rhats money spent in a good direction?

CK: I think there has been a tremendous
amount of money wasted. Bur it's nor bad
science; there has been a fundamental
misunderstanding of rhe needs of the
deminer.lr's unfortunate d1ar there was such
a gap between the scientific community and
the operational commun ity. Too much has
been d esigned from th e top end down,
things that people thought would be useful
bur have no real place in rhe field or have
lirrle pros pect of a ny operational
application. Whether some of rhar research
investmenr will pay off in rhe long rerm is
difficu lt to say, bur from th e operational
perspec tive, high techno logy hasn't
contributed a great deal. lr hasn't fulfilled
some of the promises ir made or, perhaps,
the expectations rhar people had for ir, and
rim's a shame. What I think is li kely to
happen is a gradual, incremental trendas we've been seein g-cowa rds berrer
detec ti on sensitivi ty com bined with
selectiv i ty; more ca pability, better
performance from rhe en hancem ent of
existing tools. A t some point, perhaps, we
will get usable multi-sensor detection,
which might just be rhe big step forward
rhar everyone has been waiting for.

MB: You menrion that there has nor been
a lor of communication from technologists
on down to the field personnel. H ow do
you think comm unication between users
and rhe R& D [research and development]
community c.111 be improved?
CK: There have been a lor of con ferences
and a very good annual user-focus
workshop o rganized by rhe Department
ofDefense [DoD ]. The Eu ropean Union
has done similar work, so I think rhat
communication is well-in-hand. At last,
the equ ipm en t designers and program
managers are getting our inro the field and
seeing for themselves rhe problems faced
by deminers.

CK: There are a lor of elemenrs, really.
Another thing that has changed over the
lasr years is rhar mine action is no longer
seen as a stand-alone activity. lr has ro be
i ntegrared in to an overal l regional
development plan. There are the major
issues such as politi cal support,
coordination and funding; then you get
down to rhe fundamental issues of
understanding rhe problem. The better
you understand it, the more focused and
surgical your approach to rhe solution can
be. That revolves largely around survey,
which is something else that has developed
over the last 20 years-even though people
don't necessarily agree on what it means.
What is agreed is that it makes good sense
to have a regional overview before you
launch into a program where you can't see
the wood for the trees. You have to have
some good socio-economic impact data
available in order to begin prioritizing tasks
and allocating resources , and a rea
reduction is critical ro making the best use
of those resources. In the last few years,
we have seen that the survey side is
absolutely fundamental to mine action.
The MAC has to create a capable and
well -supported ind igenous capability.
Rwanda is a great example, even though
it's a mil itary program. There you have
really high-caliber, dedicated people being
supported with in their own region and by
the U.S. Stare Deparrmenr. Many of the
national prog rams rely on outside
assistance from specialists who can channel
their experience and resources into
addressing problems. Having said d1ar, one
of the things I have a real problem wirh is
a "one-size-firs-all" approach ro different
programs. One of the things I try ro
illustrate in my assessment vis its a n d
presentations is that the d iversity of rhe
environment and the mine threat will
dictate differing approaches. There's no
poinr in training someone ro p robe in an
area where a probe cannot possibly be used,
which is p recisely what is being done in
some of rhe programs. lr just shows poor
reg ional assessment followed by an
inability to adapt to an obvious problem.

Contact Information

MB: Is ir jusr roo difficult or are there too
many time and financial constraints for
organizations to tailor their rra1111ng
programs?
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MB: After 20 years, you've seen a variety
of demi ning programs and mine action,
what do you feel needs ro be in place for
an effective demining program?
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CK: It tends to happen when nonspec ial is t s, like U.S. SOF [Special
Operations Forces] reams, are given basic
in st ruction and then senr to train
deminers. When the situation no longer
firs the template and they need alternatives,
they may nor have the depth ofknowledge
or experience to fall back on. It's always
risky ro be just one step ahead of the people
you're training. In some cases, rhe people
they're t raining have actually been
d em ining for some rime, and it's the
trainers who are behind the curve, because
most have no practical experience at all. I
have ro say rhar rhe SOF trainers J have
seen have been consistently h igh-caliber
people who are clearly dedicated to their
work, bur they are sometimes pur in an
impossible position, faced with situations
way outside their area of knowledge.

MB: I'm sure you've got a tremendous
number of lessons learned in the amount
of time you've been working in rhe field.
Where do you think demining will and
should go in the next I 0 years?

CK: Mine action is being refined
constantly. Lessons are being learned and
it's becoming more focused, more surgical.
Jt's also being better managed and there's
better integration. And all of those trends
seem set to continue. The international
Aavor, the application of lessons from one
region to another, the transfer ofexperience,
mostly by personalities moving around. The
community will continue to make steady
progress and you will gradually see more
and more regions listed as "mine safe."
There may be the odd technical innovation
that makes a major contribution, bur above
al l it will be rhe constan t and largely
unpublicized wo rk of the in-country
programs and their donor support. The
primary resource in rhis business is people
and, rhankn.Hy, we have a lor ofgood people
making steady progress. •
"All photos coumsy ofColin King.

